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NEW YORK PRACTICE COVERAGE

ment since "plaintiff . . . could not convincingly claim surprise
or prejudice." Thus,
the waiver rule may be operable only when the failure to plead
affirmatively has prejudiced the plaintiff in a manner that cannot be
remedied by the court by the award of costs, or a continuance, or
some other sanction.33
ARTICLE 31 -

DISCLOSURE

CPLR Art. 31.: Disclosure under court rule.
Kovalenko v. Dilberian 9 is an example of disclosure being
sought under court rule rather than under the CPLR.4 0 In that
action for personal injuries, plaintiff moved, pursuant to Rule III,
Part Four, Rules of the Appellate Division, Second Department,
for an order directing the defendant to serve a copy of an examination of the plaintiff conducted by the defendant's insurance carrier.
The defendant, however, explained that this examination was made
in relation to plaintiff's claim under her own medical coverage
insurance written by that same company.
The court, in denying the plaintiff's motion, noted that since
the carrier did not examine the plaintiff as defendant's representative, there was no report available subject to plaintiff's motion.
The court also held that the findings of the examination made
by the insurer were unavailable to the defendant.
CPLR 3101(a).: Discovery of the amount of insuranwe itwt allowed.
In Gold v. Jacobi,41 an automobile negligence action, the
plaintiff sought discovery of the amount of defendant's automobile
liability insurance. The court, however, held that this information
was not subject to discovery since it was not "material and
necessary" in the prosecution of the case.
Although the court noted that this was a case of first impression, a case decided under the CPA lends support to this
decision. 42 There it was held that information such as the amount
of insurance coverage could not be elicited at an examination
before trial since it was not related to the issues in the case.
38 3 WEINSTEIN, KORN & MILLER, NEW YORK CrvI

PAcncE

3018.18

(1966).
39 51 Misc. 2d 625, 273 N.Y.S.2d 642 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1966).
40 CPLR 3121(b).
4149 Misc. 2d 206, 276 N.Y.S.Zd 309 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1966).
42Milk Tank Serv., Inc. v. Wood, 200 Misc. 333, 107 N.Y.S.2d 166 (Sup.
Ct. Sullivan County 1951).
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Other courts, however, have allowed discovery of information
relating 43to insurance where it was relevant to the issues in

the case.

In Gold, plaintiff wanted this information in order to induce
settlement discussions. In support of this contention the plaintiff
cited several federal decisions 44 which required disclosure of
insurance amounts under the federal rules.45 The federal position
is based on the theory that if the policy limits are low, a party
would tend to accept a settlement more readily, thus reducing
the heavy automobile negligence dockets. However, the Gold
court claimed that the CPLR is more restrictive in its approach
to pretrial disclosure. Nevertheless, the court could have followed
the federal decisions by applying CPLR 104.46 By liberally
construing CPLR 3101, the spirit of a "just, speedy and inexpensive determination" would be promoted.
CPLR 3101(a), (d).:

Disclosure of iunnes and addresses
of witnesses.

While under the CPA a party was not generally required
to disclose the names and addresses of witnesses,47 the present
trend under the CPLR has been toward such disclosure. 4
CPLR 3101(a) allows disclosure where the identity of witnesses is "material and necessary." This provision would appear
to be limited by subdivision (d)'s proviso that where the names
are considered material prepared for litigation, they are conditionally immune from disclosure. 49 However, disclosure has been
allowed, both under the CPLR and the CPA, where the witness
was present at the time of the occurrence 5" or was an active
43Merchants Indem. Corp. v. Wallack, 14 App. Div. 2d 777, 219
N.Y.S.2d 1014 (2d Dep't 1961); Guilianelle v. Brownell, 7 App. Div. 2d
691, 179 N.Y.S.2d 344 (3d Dep't 1958).
44 Ash v. Farwell, 37 F.R.D. 553 (D. Kan. 1965); Hurley v. Schnid,
37 F.R.D. 1 (D. Ore. 1965); Hill v. Greer, 30 F.R.D. 64 (D. N.J. 1961).
45FED. R. Crv. P. §§ 26(b), 33.
461n Hill v. Greer, supra note 44, the federal court applied FED. R. Civ.
P. § 1 which is similar to CPLR 104 in order to justify disclosure of
insurance limits under the federal rules.
4 CPA § 288; Martyn v. Braun, 270 App. Div. 768, 59 N.Y.S.2d 588 (?d
Dep't 1946).
Rios v. Donovan, 21 App. Div. 2d 409, 250 N.Y.S.2d 818 (1st Dep't
1964); Matter of Pennino's Estate, 41 Misc. 2d 791, 246 N.Y.S2d 348
(Surr. Ct. Westchester County 1963).
49 Bit see 3 WEmSTm-N, KoRN & Mn.LER, Nmv YoRx CIVIL PRACrICE
1113101.11, 3101.48 (1966).
50 Votey v. New York City Transit Authority, 46 Misc. 2d 554, 260
N.Y.S.2d 124 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1965).

